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Behavior of Judges?
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ABSTRACT
This article tests for the presence of bias in judicial citations within federal circuit court
opinions. Our findings suggest bias along three dimensions. First, judges base outside-circuit
citation decisions in part on the political party of the cited judge. Judges tend to cite judges
of the opposite political party less often than would be expected considering the fraction of
the total pool of opinions attributable to judges of the opposite political party. Second, judges
are more likely to engage in biased citation practices in certain high-stakes situations. These
high-stakes situations include opinions dealing with certain subject matters (such as individual
rights and campaign finance) as well as opinions in which another judge is in active opposition.
Third, judges more often cite those judges who cite them frequently, which suggests the
presence of mutual citation clubs.
1. INTRODUCTION
The past 2 decades have witnessed an explosion in articles ranking judges
and courts in terms of their influence and quality (Caldeira 1983; Posner
1990; Kosma 1998; Landes, Lessig, and Solimine 1998; Cross and Lind-
quist 2006). In their rankings, scholars have looked to a variety of mea-
sures, including aggregate citations by other judges, citations by other
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judges accompanied by an invocation of the judge’s name, and citations
by academics (Landes, Lessig, and Solimine 1998; Klein and Morrisroe
1999; Bhattacharya and Smyth 2001; Choi and Gulati 2004).
Naysayers assert that these citation counts cannot measure matters
such as judicial quality and judgment (Gordon 1992; Goldberg 2005).
Among the measurement problems critics have flagged are the biases
that might affect these counts (Marshall 2004; Workshop on Empirical
Research in the Law 2004). For example, to the extent citation counts
confer some kind of status, judges may make citation choices on the
basis of friendship or reciprocity (that is, if you cite me, I’ll cite you)
(Klein and Morrisroe 1999). Or there may be citation biases in terms
of race, gender, educational background, and politics. Male judges may
cite other male judges more often than they cite female judges; Yale
graduates may cite other Yale graduates more; Republican judges may
cite other Republican judges more. The presence of these biases would
bring into question the validity of using citation counts as a measure of
judicial quality or reputation.
The empirical literature has examined the relationship between var-
ious types of biases affecting votes or case outcomes. Two decades of
research suggest that judges display ideological biases in their voting
patterns (Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merritt 1999; Sunstein, Schkade, and
Ellman 2004). Judges tend to vote in a manner consistent with the plat-
form of the party that appointed them. Although the focus of this re-
search has been the U.S. Supreme Court, there is evidence of ideological
voting patterns at the federal appellate level as well (Songer and Davis
1990; Songer and Haire 1992; Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman 2004).
Scholars have also found that bias is either exacerbated or dampened
in certain categories of cases. Greater bias has been detected in hot-
button areas such as civil rights and liberties (Sunstein, Schkade, and
Ellman 2004). Conversely, minimal bias, if any, has been found in areas
such as tax and securities (Schneider 2001, 2005; Grundfest and Prit-
chard 2002). Perhaps judges find disputes in certain areas mundane and
do not have strong political preferences regarding the issues (Sullivan
and Thompson 2004; Staudt, Epstein, and Wiedenbeck 2006). Note,
however, that the research on the lack of bias in the so-called mundane
areas has been minimal (Staudt Epstein, and Wiedenbeck 2006).
Scholars also find evidence of judges behaving strategically, reacting
to or anticipating the decisions of other judges on the same court, judges
on other courts, the legislative branch, and the executive branch (Revesz
1997; Epstein and Knight 2000). Evidence suggests that, at least in cer-
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tain subject areas, judges on multimember panels vote differently when
they are on panels that contain only members of the same political
persuasion than when they are on panels of mixed political persuasion
(Revesz 1997; Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman 2004; Sunstein and Miles
2006). Evidence also suggests that conflicts both within and among
courts—such as the reversal of lower court rulings and the writing of
dissenting opinions—tend to be a function of ideological differences
among the judges (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006).
In contrast to the data on voting, the data on citation practices have
not been mined extensively for the presence of bias. Most studies looking
at citations focus on the aggregate numbers of citations a judge receives
and do not look on a case-by-case basis at how a judge decides when
to cite another opinion. Scholars measuring judicial influence, for ex-
ample, have used the aggregate outside-circuit citations received as a
measure of the influence of federal circuit court judges (Landes, Lessig,
and Solimine 1998). Others have counted the invocations of a specific
judge’s name in judicial opinions as a measure of that judge’s prestige
(Klein and Morrisroe 1999).1 Moreover, the Landes, Lessig, and Solimine
and Klein and Morrisroe studies sought to measure judicial influence
and prestige; analyzing bias was a side issue. Landes, Lessig, and Soli-
mine examine political affiliation as part of an examination of a panoply
of biographical variables (including demographic statistics, law school,
academic honors, work experience, and others) and their relationship
to measures of influence. Klein and Morrisoe provide a univariate test
of the correlation between ideology and prestige. Neither study finds
meaningful bias. In their two studies of prestige on the Australian courts,
Bhattacharya and Smyth (2001; Smyth and Bhattacharya 2003) find
some indication of political-party-driven bias in the citation practices of
the High Court but none in the federal courts (which are one level below
the High Court). They speculate, in the context of their High Court
study, that the unorthodox writing methods of some of the Labour Party
1. Invocations are citations in which the author of the opinion is mentioned by name.
Judges are not normally mentioned by name when cited. Invocations are a sign of special
respect to the judge whose opinion is being cited. In this context, note that comparison of
the results from an invocation study to that of a broader citation study is imperfect. It
may be that invocations are less susceptible to citation biases because invocations tend to
occur only for a handful of judicial superstars. It is possible that the status of these su-
perstars—for example, Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, and Richard Posner—is such that
they are invoked evenly by those on both ends of the political spectrum.
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judges may have resulted in conservative judges shunning those opinions
(Bhattacharya and Smyth 2001).
Our study provides an opinion-level examination of the outside ci-
tation practices of federal appellate court judges from January 1, 1998,
to December 31, 1999, as a means of assessing bias in judicial reasoning.
There are but a handful of other studies on ideological biases in citation
practices at an opinion level (Johnson 1986; Abramowicz and Tiller
2005). Johnson looks at the Supreme Court citations to the Court’s own
past opinions and reports that ideology does not drive the citation pat-
terns. Because, at least in theory, the Supreme Court follows its own
precedent, citations to past cases should largely be driven by precedent.
Political bias may become obscured by the importance of precedent in
Johnson’s study. Abramowicz and Tiller look at the presence of political
partisanship in citations to legislative history within judicial opinions.2
They report that the tendency to cite Republican-generated legislative
history is greater when the deciding panel of federal circuit court judges
is composed primarily of Republican-appointed judges. Abramowicz and
Tiller, however, do not divide their opinions on the basis of the under-
lying subject matter. As we discuss below, the tendency to cite on the
basis of ideology varies by subject matter. Looking at citations to leg-
islative history also may understate the presence of bias. Because judges
typically will cite legislative history when interpreting a statute, the range
of possible history to cite is limited (to the history of the particular
statute). Bias may appear, but only in limited form. In comparison, fed-
eral judges citing outside-circuit opinions (which lack precedential value)
do so absent such constraints. In looking at citation patterns within
opinions, neither Johnson nor Abramowicz and Tiller control for the
pool of opinions (or legislative history) that their sample judges may
cite. It may be that a judge cites predominantly Republican-authored
2. Relatedly, Sisk, Heise, and Morriss (1998) examine judicial reasoning patterns for
a set of federal opinions on a single uniform issue: the constitutionality of the Sentencing
Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines. They look at the constitutional outcome for
these decisions as well as the reasoning used. To determine judicial reasoning, they read
each opinion and coded the opinion (on the basis of their subjective reading) for the use
of particular types of constitutional theory and reasoning approaches. They report no
significant difference between Republican- and Democrat-appointed judges for opinion
outcomes on the constitutionality issue. They nonetheless report differences in the reasoning
used in the opinions, although in a different direction from what they had predicted. Despite
the advocacy of the Reagan administration for an “original intent” constitutional theory,
Republican-appointed judges were less likely than Democrat appointees to employ origin-
alist reasoning.
J U D I C I A L C I TAT I O N B I A S / 91
past opinions (or legislative history) not because of bias but simply be-
cause the pool of available opinions is predominantly composed of such
opinions.
In our study we find that the political party of a judge is correlated
with the willingness of a judge to make outside-circuit citations. Judges
are less likely to cite judges of the opposite political party than they are
to cite judges of their own party. Moreover, the tendency not to cite
opposite-party judges is greater in high-stakes circumstances. For certain
subject matter areas (including cases involving race discrimination, sex
discrimination, age discrimination, privacy rights, affirmative action,
abortion, and other hot-button issues), judges are more likely to cite
judges of the same political party. Similarly, we examine opinions in
active opposition to another opinion in the same case (for example, a
dissent written against a majority opinion or a majority opinion for
which a dissent is present). In such “opposition” opinions, judges are
again more likely to cite judges of the same political party. Finally, we
report that judges tend to cite other judges who cite them frequently.
Section 2 sets forth hypotheses on bias in citation practices. Section
3 describes our data set. Section 4 presents empirical findings.
2. HYPOTHESES ON JUDICIAL BIAS
Broadly speaking, judges cite opinions either for their precedential value
or, to the extent the opinion is not precedential, for their reasoning. It
is the second rationale that is relevant to our analysis because we restrict
our data set to outside-circuit citations. Judges are not required to cite
opinions from other circuits as a matter of precedent but may do so for
their persuasive value. The reasoning in the cited case may serve as a
building block for the argument the judge is making or demonstrate that
other judges (especially prominent judges) have reasoned in a similar
fashion. The key is that judges exercise discretion in choosing their
outside-circuit cites. Those choices reveal information about judicial
preferences.
Why look at bias in citations when existing studies already demon-
strate that bias exists in how judges vote in judicial decisions? Citation
studies can complement and extend investigations of political bias in
judicial voting. Judges do more than vote. Judges also offer reasoning
for their decisions, and that reasoning is integrated into the body of
precedent that in turn influences the outcomes of subsequent cases. While
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a particular judge’s vote affects the outcome for the particular facts of
any given case, the reasoning of the case has the potential to influence
cases involving a range of disparate fact patterns. Given the integral role
citations play in the construction of legal arguments, examining citation
patterns furnishes a method of analyzing bias in judicial reasoning.
To see the relevance of studying citation practices among judges, we
adopt a constrained attitudinal model of judging. The attitudinal model
of judging is harsh in its simple form (Segal and Spaeth 2002). The votes
of judges are driven primarily by ideology. We posit that under the
attitudinal model, a judge’s ideological preferences also affect the choice
of citations in her legal opinions. If they could, we assume judges would
prefer to cite only those opinions that advance their own ideology; al-
ternatively, such politically motivated judges would cite only judges with
similar ideologies, either to signal their own political stripes or to burnish
the reputation of ideological fellow travelers.
What constraints stop a judge from citing only opinions that align
precisely with her given ideology under the attitudinal model? We posit
that judges are subject to at least two constraints. First, judges desire
to minimize their chances of reversal by a higher court, either an en
banc panel of the same circuit or the Supreme Court. Reversal eliminates
the lasting impact of the judge’s opinion (and the ability of the judge
to change the underlying substantive law through the opinion). Reversal
also harms a judge’s reputation. Better-written opinions (with greater
legal support) are less likely than inferior ones to get reversed. A judge
could write an opinion relying solely on inside-circuit citations and prec-
edent. However, cases that reach the federal circuit courts and result in
published opinions often contain novel issues for which inside-circuit
precedent provides no definitive answer. Citing authority from outside-
circuit judges bolsters the authority of the authoring judge’s arguments
(Walsh 1997). Citing a broad representation of outside-circuit authority
provides evidence that the position is accepted from all ideological view-
points and helps lead to a lower likelihood of reversal.
Second, judges are constrained by their desire to foster a particular
reputation among other judges, politicians, and the public in general. A
reputation for nonpartisanship, wisdom, and intelligence is better than
the opposite, particularly for judges who desire promotion to the Su-
preme Court. In addition to reversals, highly political opinions supported
with citations solely to judges aligned with the same political viewpoint
may give a judge a partisan reputation. In contrast, one way to produce
an impression of evenhandedness is to cite elite judges of the opposite
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political persuasion; such citations are more likely to be noticed and
give the citing judge greater credibility. Of course, some judges may wish
to foster a reputation for partisanship to attract the attention of political
ideologues within the executive branch in an attempt to enhance their
chances of nomination to the Supreme Court. Confirmation within the
Senate, nonetheless, will require broader-based support. In the context
of the Samuel Alito confirmation hearings, newspapers reported exten-
sively on the substance of the reasoning in Alito’s opinions, exposing
Alito’s legal views to the scrutiny of the general public (Toner and Liptak
2005; Kirkpatrick 2005; Labaton 2005).
The combination of these constraints predicts that there will be dis-
cernible patterns in citations even within an attitudinal model of citation
practices. Because of the constraints, many outside citations to other
judges will occur irrespective of particular political ideologies. At the
margin, nonetheless, incentives exist for biased citation practices. Biased
citations help signal the judges’ ideological credentials. To the extent
that outside observers rank judges on the basis of citation counts, citing
fellow ideological judges also helps enhance the reputation of these
judges (who may return the favor by citing back). Judges who desire to
shift the law toward their own ideological views may cite opinions of
other judges that contain arguments that are consistent with and support
the citing judges’ own analysis.
Examination of citation practices, compared with judicial voting
studies, allows us to investigate nuances in how political biases play out
in judging in a more fine-tuned manner. Vote decisions are all or nothing
in the sense that a circuit court judge must decide whether to reverse or
affirm an issue up on appeal. Citations, however, are more continuous,
allowing for a more exact assessment of how biased judges are in par-
ticular subject matter areas. Two judges may vote for the same outcome
in a particular given fact pattern. One judge, however, may cite equally
judges of both parties in her opinion; the other judge, if given the same
opinion to write, may cite predominantly judges of her own political
party. The difference in citation patterns gives us an objective method
of assessing the political bias involved in a judge’s legal reasoning.
The relationship between citations and judicial voting, as well, is not
necessarily linear. Some judges care more about the lasting impact of
their reasoning and the precedent of their analysis than the voting out-
come in any particular case. Such judges may, for example, choose to
vote one way but employ reasoning supported with citations that tilt
future precedent another way. For example, a judge could vote to uphold
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an insider-trading conviction, employing an opinion that radically re-
duces the ability of insiders to engage in any trades of the insiders’
company securities. Alternatively, the judge could vote to uphold the
same insider-trading conviction and employ reasoning that points out
the uniqueness of the defendant’s circumstances and opens up the scope
of trading for insiders in other more general circumstances. Even with
identical voting outcomes, the impact of the two opinions will differ.
Given the complexities involved in the incentives of judges to employ
outside-circuit citations, our study is but an initial step to mine the
insights available from examining opinion-level citation data. To focus
on the influence of politics on the decision to cite other judges, we need
a proxy for the politics of specific judges. We use the political party of
the president who nominated a judge as a proxy for the judge’s politics
(Revesz 1997; Pinello 1999; Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman 2004). We
examine three specific hypotheses as set forth below.
Hypothesis 1: Party Bias Hypothesis. When citing outside-circuit
opinions, judges are more likely to cite opinions authored by judges of
their own political party affiliation than judges of the opposite party af-
filiation.
Hypothesis 1 addresses the prospect that political bias affects citation
patterns. If judges put forth opinions that are skewed toward their own
political leanings, they will likely cite opinions written by judges with a
similar political persuasion in support. Conversely, such judges will tend
not to cite judges of the opposite political party.
Bias in citations undermines the accuracy of judicial rankings based
on aggregate citation counts. Evidence in support of the party bias hy-
pothesis calls into question the value of ranking judges on the basis of
citations. Rankings based on aggregate citation counts implicitly assume
that citations reflect some broad-based notion of judicial quality. Rank-
ings make sense if we assume, for example, that one judge cites another
judge for the quality, wisdom, and articulateness of the cited judge’s
reasoning. In contrast, if a judge cites another judge simply because they
are members of the same political party, it becomes more difficult to
justify the use of aggregate citation counts to rank judicial quality (at
least on broad notions of quality).
Studies based on citation counts aside, is there a problem if judges
display ideology in their judicial reasoning? Some judges may cite the
same group of judges because they value the particular judicial philos-
ophy of the group. It is the rare judge who does not hold a particular
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jurisprudence in how to decide court decisions. Nonetheless, providing
transparency on the precise type of ideology that drives judges is im-
portant. We assert that judges, when deciding cases, would rather appear
as if their decisions were decided using widely held rather than narrowly
held ideologies. Appealing to widely held ideologies casts the judge in
a favorable light among other judges and the public in general. Few
judges would like to appear as lacking in impartiality, a widely held goal
of judging, before their peers and the public. As a result, judges may in
fact make decisions on the basis of one type of narrowly held ideology
or political leaning but nonetheless not want to advertise to the world
that they hold this bias. Deciding a case on the basis of judicial restraint
is one thing. Referring to judicial restraint while simply deciding on the
basis of more narrowly held political beliefs, such as one’s personal views
about abortion, is another thing. Studying the extent to which a judge
associates systematically (through citation practices) with particular sub-
sets of judges having similar political persuasions may help reveal the
extent to which otherwise hidden political bias affects decision making.
Hypothesis 2: High-Stakes Hypothesis. The tendency to cite judges
of the same political party is greater for some (higher stakes) subject
matters than for others. The tendency is also greater for opinions in which
a judge is in active opposition to other judges.
Here we posit that the willingness to rely on (or be persuaded by) a
different viewpoint is broader in certain cases and narrower in others.
In mundane areas that most judges do not care about much—perhaps
tax or bankruptcy—judges may be willing to trust the analyses of a
broad array of colleagues, regardless of political affiliation. In cases
involving politically hot issues, however, not only may judges be sus-
picious of the analyses of other judges whose preferences are likely dif-
ferent, but also their own views may be strong and fixed.3 Our prediction
is that judges are more likely to cite judges of the same party in cases
involving high-stakes subjects than in those involving mundane subjects.
Cognitive limitations may affect a judge’s pattern of citations. Judges
are resource constrained and do not have the time to analyze every issue
from first principles. One shortcut for them is to rely on the analyses of
3. Along these lines, Wahlbeck and Maltzman (1996) posit that justices are less likely
to switch votes between the conference and the final vote on the merits in salient cases
than in average cases. This is true, they argue, because the justices’ positions will be
relatively fixed, and the likelihood that new information will alter a justice’s opinion is
relatively low.
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other judges in similar cases. To the extent that there are other judges
whose ideologies and analytics they trust, judges are likely to rely on
and cite the analyses of those other judges. Such citation biases will be
more pronounced in areas where the level of trust of those from the
opposite political party is low, specifically in politically charged areas
such as civil rights or the separation of church and state.
A different high-stakes situation occurs when another judge writes
an opposing opinion. The stakes are likely high for two reasons. First,
the very existence of an opposing opinion suggests that the issues in the
case are more important and less constrained by precedent than usual
(and when the case involves a hot-button issue like abortion, the issues
are likely more political than usual) (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek
2006). Second, the presence of a dissent serves to garner more than the
usual amount of attention from outsiders.
One other bias we examine other than political bias is the tendency
of judges to cite those who cite them. We formalize our hypothesis on
mutual citation clubs as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Citation Club Hypothesis. When citing outside-circuit
opinions, judges are more likely to cite judges who cite them frequently.
The tendency to cite back increases with (a) the similarity of the political
ideologies of the judges and (b) the strength of the personal relationship
between the judges. The tendency decreases with (c) the status of the
particular citing judge as an elite judge.
Judges may cite those who cite them for a variety of reasons. Judges
may care about their citation counts because these counts increasingly
constitute part of the evaluations of the judge’s performance and legacy.
They may develop implicit agreements with other judges that they will
cite them if those other judges reciprocate with citations. We test three
additional motivations behind the desire to engage in citation club prac-
tices. First, judges may cite judges with similar political ideologies more
often. If we observe citation-club-like patterns in citations, such patterns
may be driven by commonly held political beliefs. Where judges have
similar ideologies, they will cite each other’s opinions as supportive of
their own views. Second, judges may cite other judges with whom they
have a stronger personal relationship (such as having attended the same
law school). A personal relationship may help ensure reciprocity in ci-
tations (that is, if I cite you, I know there’s a greater chance you’ll cite
me back if we’re friends). Third, judges of a particular elite stature and
reputation may tend to avoid citation club practices. We hypothesize
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that judges who command greater respect (for example, Judge Richard
Posner) may have less need to engage in citation club practices to bolster
their citation counts or burnish their reputations. Put differently, the
other judges citing an elite judge are likely doing so primarily for the
respectability and credibility that comes associated with such a citation,
not out of the hope of reciprocal citations by that elite judge.
3. DATA SET DESCRIPTION
The data set consists of judicial opinions authored by federal circuit
court judges from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 1999, as obtained
from Choi and Gulati (2004). In assessing citations we constrained our
sample to federal circuit court judges still active (and not with senior
status) as of May 2003, when we started to compile the data.4 Judges
near retirement may engage in different citation practices. A judge near
retirement may not care as much about her reputation as a judge or the
effect of reversals on her possibility of promotion (to the Supreme
Court). Judges near retirement may also not benefit from fostering close
relationships with judges of similar ideology or judges who cite them
frequently since these professional relationships will not be lengthy.
Our constraint leaves us with opinions from a total of 98 judges.
Starting from the set of opinions in Choi and Gulati (2004), we examined
each opinion and coded citations from the set of 98 active judges in our
sample back to one of those 98 judges. We impose these constraints for
two reasons. First, judges likely pay attention to citations from other
active judges who provide the prospect of future reciprocal citations.
Only citations to active judges pose this possibility. Further, it is likely
that the most recent cases provide the fullest description of the current
law. Cases from multiple decades prior to a current case likely receive
citations only when there is no more recent treatment of the issue or
when the case itself has become canonical.5
Second, limiting our sample to the 98 active judges (and their citations
back to opinions authored by one of those 98 judges) allows us to
construct a control for the pool of opinions available for citation (that
4. To ensure a full 2 years of opinion data for each judge, we also excluded judges
appointed after January 1, 1998.
5. Canonical cases present the additional complication that the analytical propositions
that they stand for may become so well accepted that the authoring judge is no longer
cited for it.
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is, whether the pool of opinions is more Republican- or Democrat-judge
authored). A judge may cite Republican-authored opinions more fre-
quently simply because the pool of past opinions is relatively more Re-
publican authored. We assume that because the opinions written by the
active judges are all relatively recent, they all have an equal chance of
citation absent bias. In contrast, if we had looked at citations to any
opinion generally, we would lack a control pool against which to assess
the citation pattern. Particularly for older opinions from nonactive
judges, not all the opinions will have an equal chance of citation. Prior
research tells us that the probability that a particular opinion will be
cited depreciates over time (Landes and Posner 1976; Bhattacharya and
Smyth 2001; Smith 2006). Including data for judges from more than a
few decades prior to our data set would require us to make depreciation
adjustments for judges of different vintages. By using only active judges,
we avoid these adjustments. While opinions among even active judges
are not all equal, the differences are less than if we were to include past
judges or senior judges.
From the Choi and Gulati (2004) data set, we started with published
opinions authored in 1998 and 1999, excluding the year 2000 because
of resource constraints.6 For the 6,348 opinions from our data set that
were authored in 1998 and 1999, we hand coded citations contained in
each opinion, recording all citations to an opinion authored by one of
the 98 federal circuit court judges in our sample. We code whether a
judge cites judges who are of the same or opposite party, using the party
of the president who nominated a judge as a proxy for the judge’s
political party.
We limit our analysis to outside-circuit citations, which leaves us with
3,072 opinions with at least one outside citation to a sample judge.
Citations to judges within the same circuit, we assume, are more likely
to be driven by the dictates of precedent than are outside-circuit citations.
Focusing on outside citations puts the spotlight on opinions for which
judges have the greatest discretion in their citation practice. That the
choice to make an outside citation is highly discretionary suggests two
things. First, for the most part, these citations will show up only when
the issues are important and undecided (Solberg, Emrey, and Haire
2006), in other words, where there is no clear internal circuit precedent
deciding the matter. Second, because judges tend to cite opinions from
6. Together with several research assistants, we spent over 2 years collecting the data
for this article.
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outside courts selectively (Klein 2002), these citations are unlikely to be
routine or pro forma citations (such as the boilerplate string cites that
some judges may cut and paste for matters such as the standard of
review).7 A downside to using outside-circuit citations, though, is that
we miss the opportunity to capture some of the patterns of reciprocal
citation practices that may develop within circuits where judges build
thick personal relationships over long periods of interaction. We also
limit our analysis to published opinions. As Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and
Schwab (1995) discuss, omitting unpublished opinions excludes a sub-
stantial universe of judge-authored opinions. However, if judges do act
with an ideological bias, we expect this bias to appear where ideology
matters the most: published opinions that affect the development of
precedent. Unpublished opinions, in contrast, provide judges with little
ability to affect the development of the law.8
Developing data on which other judges are cited in a particular
judge’s opinions allows us to parse the bias question with added pre-
cision. Because we also code the cases in terms of subject areas, we can
evaluate whether biases are more likely to occur in hot-button areas such
as civil rights. The conventional method of collecting aggregate citation
numbers and regressing them on a series of explanatory variables, in-
cluding one for political affiliation, does not allow for parsing based on
the subject matter of specific opinions. Table A1 provides the variables
and their definitions, and Tables 1–3 report the summary statistics of
our sample
4. EMPIRICAL TESTS
4.1. Party Bias Hypothesis
For each individual opinion, we calculate the number of outside-circuit
citations that went to a judge of the opposite political party divided by
7. Another technique to separate out the strong citations from string or otherwise weak
citations is to count only those citations with an accompanying explicit discussion of the
case or a quote from it (Walsh 1997; Solberg, Emrey, and Haire 2006). Each of these
techniques, though, is likely to be both under- and overinclusive in terms of sorting between
strong and weak citations.
8. The following is an example of our coding: Judge Boudin wrote the majority opinion
for Flynn v. City of Boston (140 F.3d 42 [1st Cir. 1998]). We looked through the opinion,
coding for citations to any of our set of 98 active federal circuit court judges. In the opinion,
Boudin cited one judge outside the First Circuit from our set of 98 judges: Judge Luttig
of the Fourth Circuit. Both Boudin and Luttig were appointed by a Republican president.
We therefore treated Boudin’s citation of Luttig as a same-party, outside-circuit citation.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics by Circuit Court
Circuit Court
1998 1999
Opinions Percentage Opinions Percentage
1 105 7.0 116 7.4
2 88 5.9 63 4.0
3 82 5.5 92 5.8
4 98 6.6 117 7.4
5 185 12.4 196 12.4
6 100 6.7 125 7.9
7 260 17.4 282 17.9
8 103 6.9 99 6.3
9 116 7.8 133 8.4
10 146 9.8 156 9.9
11 120 8.0 131 8.3
D.C. 92 6.2 67 4.2
Total 1,495 100.0 1,577 100.0
Note. Percentages do not add to 100.0 because of rounding. Pearson x2 ;(10)p 14.734
Pr p .195.
Table 2. Summary Statistics by Opinion
Type of Opinion Opinions Percentage
Majority 2,801 91.2
Dissent 210 6.8
Concurring 61 2.0
Total 3,072 100.0
the total number of outside-circuit citations to one of the 98 judges in
our sample (denoted Opposite_Party). Neither the number of judges nor
the number of opinions written by the judges is equally divided between
Republicans and Democrats. A judge may cite Republican-judge-written
opinions more frequently because a greater fraction of the pool of past
opinions came from Republican judges. To control for this, we calculate
the pool of available outside-circuit opinions for each judge. First, we
start with a particular judge (for example, Judge Boudin of the First
Circuit). Second, we identify the judges in our set of 98 judges who are
outside-circuit judges (for example, all judges in our sample who are
outside the First Circuit). Third, for each outside-circuit judge, we tab-
ulate the total number of opinions written prior to 1998, the start of
our data set. Last, we calculate the number of opinions written by judges
of the opposite political party divided by the total pool of opinions
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Variables
Variable Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis
Opposite_Party .423 .333 .420 .312 1.433
Opposite_Pool .441 .301 .247 .544 1.347
Years_Exp 9.291 8.000 5.524 .418 2.292
Chief Judge .095 .000 .293 2.761 8.626
Independence .078 .067 .183 .076 3.322
GHP .078 .116 .376 .179 1.631
Opposition .170 .000 .375 1.761 4.101
Opposition_Same Party .063 .000 .244 3.581 13.822
Opposition_Opposite Party .099 .000 .299 2.686 8.215
Top5_Cites .191 .000 .321 1.611 4.306
Top5_Pool .141 .134 .056 1.095 3.910
Top5_Same_Party .621 .826 .393 .571 1.497
Influential Judge .102 .000 .303 2.626 7.897
Less Well Represented School .288 .000 .453 .934 1.873
written by all outside-circuit judges in our sample prior to 1998 (denoted
Opposite_Pool). If judges were to cite outside-circuit judges randomly,
the Opposite_Pool fraction would represent the baseline fraction of out-
side-circuit opinions to judges of the opposite political party available
to be cited.
Table 4 reports a t-test comparison of the mean for the variables
Opposite_Party and Opposite_Pool. For the pool of all judges in our
sample, the fraction of outside-circuit citations to opposite-party judges
is equal to .423. In contrast, the pool of opinions for the opposite party
judges as a fraction of the pool of past opinions is equal to .441. The
difference between Opposite_Party and Opposite_Pool is significant at
the 1 percent confidence level. On average, judges have a tendency to
prefer citing judges of their political party, which supports the party bias
hypothesis.
Table 4 also reports the comparison between Opposite_Party and
Opposite_Pool separately for Democrat and Republican judges. Dem-
ocrat judges are significantly less likely to cite judges of the opposite
party. No significant difference, however, exists between the tendency
of Republican judges to cite judges of the opposite party outside their
circuit compared with the pool of opposite-party opinions. At first
glance, it appears that Democrat judges are more biased than their Re-
publican counterparts.9
9. The comparison of Democrat and Republican judges in terms of citation patterns,
despite our correction for pool effects, remains complicated because of the differential in
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Table 4. Fraction of Outside-Circuit Citations to Opposite-Party Judges Relative to the Pool
of Opinions
N Opposite_Party Opposite_Pool P
All opinions 3,072 .423 .441 .005
Authored by Democrat judge 1,120 .732 .765 .002
Authored by Republican judge 1,952 .246 .255 .253
Note. The P-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between Opposite_Party and
Opposite_Pool.
4.2. Opinion Subject Matter
The tendency of judges to cite judges of the opposite political party may
vary depending on the subject matter of the opinion. For more salient,
high-stakes cases, judges may have an increased propensity to decide
along party lines. An opinion dealing with a civil rights issue may result
in an increased level of partisanship compared with an opinion dealing
with a private contract law issue. To examine whether subject matter
determines citation practices, we categorize our opinions into 18 cate-
gories plus an “other” category for opinions we do not specifically cat-
egorize (for a total of 19 categories). A description of each subject matter
category is provided in Table A2.
Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman (2004) find that ideological effects in
judicial voting patterns are stronger for certain categories of cases, in-
cluding politically heated areas such as civil rights. Our goal was to test
for the presence of subject area effects in citation data. Sunstein, Schkade,
and Ellman used 14 categories of cases, including abortion, capital pun-
ishment, piercing the corporate veil, campaign finance, affirmative ac-
tion, and federalism.
For two reasons, we had to modify the Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman
categorization. First, our data set was constructed to capture the full
range of cases decided by active federal appellate court judges over the
the pools. The pool of Republican-judge-authored opinions (approximately 75 percent of
the overall pool) is much larger than the pool of Democrat-judge-authored opinions. This
means that Republican judges are more likely to have the option of citing a same-party-
authored opinion on any particular topic than are their Democrat counterparts. For ex-
ample, on the question of how to calculate damages in a securities fraud case, a Democrat
judge might find that she has no option but to cite a Republican-judge-authored opinion,
whereas a Republican judge in the same position might find that she has two or three
Republican-judge-authored opinions on the topic. The implication then is that we should
be more likely to find that Republicans disproportionately cite other Republicans than their
Democrat counterparts. What we find is the converse.
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1998–1999 period. That choice produced a larger number of subject
areas than Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman had, particularly in the area
of private law. We therefore constructed subject matter categories for a
variety of private law areas, including private law (contracts, creditor
versus debtor law, and so forth), intellectual property, tax, federal busi-
ness law (securities regulation, bankruptcy, and so forth), and torts.
Second, because we looked at only a 2-year period, there were certain
areas, such as abortion, for which we did not have enough cases to
conduct a meaningful analysis. Hence, we had to broaden the size of
our subject matter categories beyond those of Sunstein, Schkade, and
Ellman. For example, we combined all the cases involving civil rights,
including abortion cases, into a single rights category, whereas Sunstein,
Schkade, and Ellman had six separate categories of civil rights cases
(affirmative action, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, Title VII, dis-
ability, and abortion).
The next step was to find an exogenous method of determining which
subject areas were high-stakes areas with political salience for circuit
court judges. For that, we followed Epstein and Segal (2000) in focusing
on news stories relating to the U.S. Supreme Court on the front page of
the New York Times. We assumed that issues getting the most discussion
in the context of the Supreme Court were likely politically salient from
a circuit court judge’s point of view. We examined New York Times
front-page articles from the period between January 1, 1993, and De-
cember 31, 1997.10 Looking at this time period, representing the 4-year
period preceding the commencement of our data set, allows us to canvass
those issues most salient to judges at the time. The time period included
two nominations and confirmations to the Court (Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer), raising the likelihood that articles within the time period dis-
cussed issues most salient to the selection of justices to the Court. We
skimmed each article and counted references to our subject matter cat-
egories (that is, if both abortion and capital punishment were mentioned
in a particular article, we counted one mention in the rights category
and one mention in the capital punishment category). Results are re-
ported in Table A3.
The category with the greatest salience was the rights category, with
almost 200 mentions (over four times the number of mentions as the
second-highest category, First Amendment). Some of our subject matter
10. We searched for “supreme court” in the Westlaw NYT data base and focused only
on stories that we determined dealt with the U.S. Supreme Court.
104 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 7 ( 1 ) / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 8
Table 5. Subject Matter of Opinions
N Opposite_Party Opposite_Pool P
Category:
Church and state 18 .454 .476 .756
Campaign finance 23 .367 .477 .146
Federalism 16 .413 .418 .957
First Amendment 76 .412 .453 .276
Rights 447 .396 .436 .011
Government actions 40 .32 .399 .103
Capital punishment 76 .39 .45 .097
Administrative law 99 .471 .477 .887
Takings and property 21 .356 .379 .813
Tax 68 .456 .481 .592
Federal business law 210 .373 .413 .109
Environment 48 .502 .440 .230
Intellectual property 48 .493 .460 .546
Torts 98 .334 .384 .181
Immigration 50 .527 .478 .413
Criminal 1,114 .448 .447 .878
Labor 359 .399 .451 .007
Private law 156 .407 .403 .872
Other 105 .475 .441 .329
Top salient 816 .402 .442 .000
Bottom salient 2,256 .431 .440 .211
Total 3,072 .423 .441 .005
Note. The P-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between Opposite_Party and
Opposite_Pool.
categories span a greater body of law than others do. We may observe
more articles relating to criminal law than campaign finance because of
the breadth of our definition of the criminal law area. To scale each
category, we divide the number of mentions by the total number of
authored opinions in our data set for that subject matter category. Using
this ratio, the top five subject matter categories in terms of public salience
include church and state, campaign finance, federalism, First Amend-
ment, and rights.
Table 5 provides a breakdown of the number of opinions in our
sample for each category and a t-test comparison of the means for
Opposite_Party and Opposite_Pool for each category. Among the subject
matter categories in the top half as ranked by salience, the coefficient
for Opposite_Party is lower than that for Opposite_Pool for the rights
category of opinions (the difference is significant at just above the 1
percent confidence level). The difference between the coefficients for the
capital punishment category is significant at the 10 percent level. For
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the subject matter categories in the bottom half as ranked by salience,
only the coefficients for the labor category show a significant difference
(at the 1 percent level).
Many of the subject matter categories have only a small number of
cases—for example, there are only 16 federalism cases. We therefore
also examine the aggregate of the subject matter categories in the top
half as ranked by salience (Top Salient) and the aggregate of those cat-
egories in the bottom half (Bottom Salient). Table 5 reports that the
coefficient for Opposite_Party for the top-salient category is significantly
lower than that for Opposite_Pool (significant at the 1 percent level),
and this finding is consistent with judges avoiding opposite-party cita-
tions in high-stakes cases. In contrast, no significant difference exists for
coefficients for the bottom-salient category. This result is consistent with
the high-stakes hypothesis. The presence of bias in only certain subject
matter areas, particularly those in the top-salient category, supports the
view that the evidence in support of bias in citations (the party bias
hypothesis) is not spurious but rather reflects the underlying decision-
making processes of judges.
To examine the high-stakes hypothesis further, we estimate an or-
dinary least squares model. The unit of analysis in our model is an
opinion authored by a judge in our sample. The model is as follows:
Opposite_Partyp a b Top Salient b GHPi 1i 2i
 b Top Salient#GHP b Control3i ki ki
 Year EffectsCircuit Effects  .i
We include Top Salient to assess the importance of political salience
in determining the tendency of a judge to avoid citations to opposite-
party outside-circuit judges. To determine the importance of a judge’s
political leanings for whether the judge will side with opposite-party
judges, we include a continuous measure of a judge’s ideology obtained
from Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) and call it GHP.11 The variable
GHP stands for a score based on the ideological preferences of the ap-
pointing president and home state senators that ranges from 1 (most
liberal) to 1 (most conservative). The GHP score is correlated with
whether a judge is Republican (correlation coefficient p .8534) and
provides a continuous analog to our binary Republican/Democrat clas-
sification of judges. We include an interaction term, Top Salient# GHP,
11. We thank Stefanie Lindquist for giving us these scores.
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to examine whether political leanings take on any additional importance
for high-stakes opinions.
Our model includes a number of control variables specific to a judge
that may affect the incidence of citations to other party judges. The term
Opposite_Party is the number of citations contained in an opinion that
are to judges (in the sample of 98 judges) of the opposite political party
as a fraction of the number of citations in the opinion to any of the
sample judges. We include Opposite_Pool to control for the pool of past
opinions that a judge may cite.
We include the log of the years of experience of the specific judge
(expressed as Ln(Year_Exp)). Judges with more experience on the bench
may develop a stronger sense of their favored judges and cases to cite.
We also use an indicator variable for whether the author is the chief
judge of her particular circuit. Holding the position of chief judge may
lead judges to take more neutral postures in their citation practices.
A control for the independence of the judge is also included. We
expect judges who are generally skewed toward one political end of the
spectrum to exhibit this bias in their citation practices. In creating this
measure in Choi and Gulati (2004), we obtained the percentage of op-
posing opinions (for example, a dissent against a majority opinion and
a majority against a dissent opinion) for which a particular judge wrote
an opposing opinion against the opinion of a judge of the same political
party (the Actual Same Party Opposing Fraction). For each judge, we
determined the political party (as proxied by the party of the appointing
president) of the other active judges on each circuit from 1998 to 1999
(including those who eventually gained senior status or retired), obtain-
ing the baseline percentage of same-party judges on the circuit (the Pre-
dicted Same Party Opposing Fraction). If a judge opposes other judges
on the same circuit at random, we posit that the Actual Same Party
Opposing Fraction should equal the Predicted Same Party Opposing
Fraction. Independence is defined as being equal to the Actual Same
Party Opposing Fraction minus the Predicted Same Party Opposing Frac-
tion. A more negative number under our independence measure indicates
a judge who avoids taking positions opposite those of judges of the same
political party.
Year and circuit fixed effects serve to control for differences related
to the year of the opinion and the circuit in which the authoring judge
sits. The Seventh Circuit, for example, is notorious for the volume of
opinions its judges publish. Producing a high volume of opinions may
lead judges to focus less on citations, leading to more neutral citation
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Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares Model of Opposite_Party
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Top Salient .034* (2.320) .033* (2.270)
GHP .022 (.580)
Top Salient # GHP .017 (.440)
Opposite_Pool .905** (15.720)
Ln(Year_Exp) .006 (.450)
Chief Judge .026 (1.160)
Independence .003 (.080)
Constant .061 (1.300) .441** (45.630)
Circuit fixed effects Yes No
Judge fixed effects No Yes
Note. Both models contain year fixed effects and have 3,072 observations. The
t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard er-
rors. The adjusted R2-value was .312 for model 1 and .313 for model 2.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
practices. Similarly, there are circuits, such as the Fourth Circuit, that
are thought of as overtly politicized.
Table 6 reports the results from our model.12 Note from model 1 that
the coefficient on Top Salient is negative and significant at the 5 percent
level. Judges authoring high-stakes opinions are less likely to cite
opposite-party judges than same-party judges. The results from model
1 are consistent with the high-stakes hypothesis. Unlike our sum-
mary statistics, though, we find no difference in the tendency to avoid
opposite-party judges among judges with different degrees of political
leanings as measured by the GHP score. The coefficient on GHP is not
significantly different from zero. Similarly, the coefficient on Top Salient
# GHP is not significantly different from zero. Even in opinions in-
volving high-stakes subject matters, the degree of political leaning of a
particular judge does not correlate with the tendency to avoid citations
to opposite-party judges.
Model 1 also allows us to examine the question of circuit biases. We
use the First Circuit, a traditionally respected circuit, as our baseline for
the circuit fixed effects in our model. Only the Fifth Circuit (significant
at the 5 percent level) and the Sixth Circuit (significant at the 10 percent
level) were significantly different from the First Circuit baseline (data
not shown). For the Fifth and the Sixth Circuits, the coefficient was
12. For ease of exposition, we do not report all of the individual circuit and judge
fixed effect coefficients in our models.
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positive, which indicates that the judges in these circuits display a greater
tendency to cite opposite-party judges, other things being equal. How-
ever, we test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all the circuit
variables are equal to each other and zero and are unable to reject the
null hypothesis ( ; Prob ).F(10,3036)p 1.37 1 Fp .1817
Perhaps what matters is not whether a judge is more liberal (a neg-
ative GHP score) or conservative (a positive GHP score) but instead that
a judge is more ideological, whether liberal or conservative, compared
with being neutral (a zero GHP score). To test for this, we reestimate
model 1 and replace the GHP variable with the absolute value of the
GHP score instead. The coefficients on the absolute value of GHP and
Top Salient interacted with the absolute value of GHP are not signifi-
cantly different from zero (data not shown).
As an additional robustness check, we omit judge-author specific
variables (GHP, Top Salient # GHP, Opposite_Pool, Ln(Year_Exp),
Chief Judge, and Independence) and circuit fixed effects and instead
include judge fixed effects in the model, reported as model 2 in Table
6. We obtain the same qualitative results as those for model 1.13
To focus more specifically on the different subject matter categories,
we replace Top Salient and the Top Salient # GHP interaction term in
model 1 with indicator variables for the 18 subject matter categories,
using the “other” category as the base category. The results for model
1 are presented in Table 7. Note that among the top-salient categories,
the coefficients on the rights and government action categories are neg-
ative and significant at the 5 percent level; similarly the coefficients on
the campaign finance and capital punishment categories are significant
at the 10 percent level. In contrast, for the bottom-salient category, the
coefficient on Labor is negative and significant at the 5 percent level,
and the coefficient on Federal Business Law is negative and significant
at the 10 percent level. Compared with the “other” base category, judges
are more likely to avoid citation to opposite-party judges for these spe-
13. Federal circuit court judges use clerks. Clerks may affect citation patterns. We
control for the influence of clerks with a proxy for the propensity of a specific judge to
author opinions (and presumably rely less on clerks). Our proxy is the log of the total
number of self-citations by a judge to opinions authored from 1998 to 2000, as obtained
from Choi and Gulati (2004). We expect that judges who author their own opinions will
have greater familiarity with their own opinions and therefore will be more likely to cite
themselves than those judges who delegate research and writing to their law clerks (Landes,
Lessig, and Solimine 1998). The addition of the variable for log of the total number of
self-citations (data not shown) does not alter the qualitative results of models 1 or 2 shown
in Table 6.
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Table 7. Ordinary Least Squares Model of Opposite_Party by Subject Matter
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Church and State .073 (.930) .075 (.960)
Campaign Finance .145 (1.830) .151 (1.890)
Federalism .030 (.280) .021 (.200)
First Amendment .068 (1.340) .077 (1.490)
Rights .076* (2.020) .075 (1.930)
Government Actions .122* (2.100) .116 (1.940)
Capital Punishment .097 (1.940) .100 (1.950)
Administrative Law .041 (.790) .049 (.930)
Takings and Property .072 (.740) .078 (.760)
Private Law .036 (.810) .035 (.780)
Tax .051 (.920) .055 (.990)
Federal Business Law .076 (1.800) .076 (1.740)
Environment .032 (.530) .035 (.580)
Intellectual Property .006 (.090) .008 (.120)
Torts .087 (1.720) .085 (1.650)
Immigration .018 (.270) .025 (.360)
Criminal .034 (.950) .035 (.960)
Labor .084* (2.150) .086* (2.120)
GHP .019 (.530)
Opposite_Pool .899** (15.580)
Ln(Year_Exp) .008 (.570)
Chief Judge .026 (1.150)
Independence .004 (.100)
Constant .109 (1.900) .484** (13.570)
Circuit fixed effects Yes No
Judge fixed effects No Yes
Note. Both models contain year fixed effects and have 3,072 observations. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors.
The adjusted R2-value for both models was .313.
Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant the 1% level.
cific categories of opinions. While the top-salient (bottom-salient) cat-
egory as a group displays significant (insignificant) party bias, variation
exists within the specific subject matter categories. Judicial bias may
extend into areas such as business law that are not conventionally
thought of as scenes of ideological bias.14
As a robustness check, we omit judge-author specific characteristic
variables (GHP, Opposite_Pool, Ln(Year_Exp), Chief Judge, and Inde-
pendence) and circuit fixed effects and instead include judge fixed effects
14. Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman (2004) similarly find that ideological voting extends
to cases involving piercing the corporate veil.
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and report the results of model 2 in Table 7. We obtain the same qual-
itative results as those for model 1.15
4.3. Opposing Opinions
We analyze whether judges are less likely to cite judges of the opposite
political party when faced with opposition from another judge in the
same case. Looking at cases in which judges chose to dissent gives us a
different method of testing whether bias exists in high-stakes issues.
There are likely to be issues in otherwise mundane areas such as securities
law that might be politically heated—for example, the issue of what the
pleading standard ought to be for securities fraud class actions. Put
another way, while our subject matter categories are suggestive as to
what types of opinions may lead judges to look to judges of the same
political party, the categories likely imperfectly track where bias occurs.
In contrast, the writing of a dissent takes additional effort, and we
assume that these resource-constrained judges will use their time and
energy to write dissents only when they consider issues to be of special
importance. Similarly, we posit that judges writing majority opinions
facing dissents will take extra care in crafting their opinions.
To assess the impact of an opposing judge, we add the Opposition
indicator variable (set equal to one if there exists an opposing opinion
and zero otherwise) to models 1 and 2. An opposing opinion situation
exists when (1) a judge writes a majority opinion and a dissent is present
and (2) when a judge writes a dissenting opinion against a majority
opinion. Table 8 reports our results.
Note that the coefficient on Opposition is negative and significant at
the 5 percent level for model 1 (which includes circuit and year fixed
effects) and negative and significant at the 10 percent level for model 2
(which includes judge and year fixed effects). Evidence exists that judges
are less likely to cite opposite-party judges when either dissenting against
majority opinions or writing the majority opinion when a dissent exists.
15. To assess the importance of the political beliefs of the citing judge, we added
interaction terms for each subject matter variable and the GHP score (for example, Private
Law # GHP) to model 1. These interaction terms allow us to see whether liberal or
conservative judges tend to engage in more biased citation patterns. The coefficients for
the interaction terms between Private Law, First Amendment, and Church and State and
GHP are negative and significant at the 10 percent level (data not shown). More conser-
vative judges are less likely to cite opposite-party judges for these types of cases. However,
the coefficient on Immigration # GHP is positive and significant at the 10 percent level.
More conservative judges are more likely to cite opposite-party judges for immigration
cases. It is unclear what to make of the difference in the pattern of bias.
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Table 8. Opposing Opinions
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Opposition .034* (2.030) .030 (1.760)
Top Salient .032* (2.170) .031* (2.140)
GHP .021 (.560)
Top Salient # GHP .018 (.460)
Constant .070 (1.500) .446** (44.350)
Judge controls Yes No
Circuit fixed effects Yes No
Judge fixed effects No Yes
Note. The dependent variable is Opposite_Party. Judge controls include Oppo-
site_Pool, Ln(Year_Exp), Chief Judge, and Independence and are not reported.
Both models contain year fixed effects and have 3,072 observations. The t-statistics
(in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. The
adjusted R2-value for both models was .313.
Coefficient significant at the 10% level.
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level.
** Coefficient significant at the 1% level.
This result is consistent with the high-stakes hypothesis that judges look
to their own party for support in citing outside-circuit opinions when
they face an opposing opinion in the same case.16
To assess further the incentive to cite opinions written by judges of
the same party when faced with an opposing opinion, we replace
Opposition in models 1 and 2 of Table 8 with the indicator variables
Opposition_Same Party and Opposition_Opposite Party (reported as
models 1 and 2 in Table 9).17 Opposition_Same Party is equal to one if
the opposition opinion involves a judge of the same political party and
zero otherwise. Opposition_Opposite Party is equal to one if the op-
position opinion involves a judge of the opposite political party and zero
otherwise. We also exclude the Top Salient # GHP interaction term
from the model. Instead, we include the interaction terms Top Salient
# Opposition_Same Party and Top Salient # Opposition_Opposite
Party. These interaction terms allow us to examine whether citation
practices differ in opposition situations involving high-stakes subject
matter categories.
Table 9 reports that the coefficients on Opposition_Same Party are
16. For robustness, we reestimated model 1, replacing Top Salient and Top Salient#
GHP with the 18 indicator variables for the subject matter categories (using “other” as
the base category). We obtained similar qualitative results with respect to Opposition:
negative and significant at the 10 percent level (data not shown).
17. Note that Opposition p Opposition_Same Party  Opposition_Opposite Party.
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Table 9. Opposing Opinions by Party
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Opposition_Same Party .034 (.970) .035 (1.010)
Opposition_Opposite Party .064* (2.580) .059* (2.330)
Top Salient .039* (2.420) .040* (2.440)
Top Salient # Opposition_Same Party .043 (.800) .054 (.990)
Top Salient # Opposition_Opposite Party .045 (1.040) .044 (1.010)
GHP .016 (.440)
Constant .448** (44.070) .448** (44.070)
Judge controls Yes No
Circuit fixed effects Yes No
Judge fixed effects No Yes
Note. The dependent variable is Opposite_Party. Judge controls include Opposite_Pool,
Ln(Year_Exp), Chief Judge, and Independence and are not reported. Both models contain
year fixed effects and have 3,072 observations. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are cal-
culated using Huber-White robust standard errors. The adjusted R2-value for both models
was .313.
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level.
** Coefficient significant at the 1% level.
not significantly different from zero in both models. Judges do not act
differently in their citation behavior when facing an opposing opinion
from a same-party judge. In contrast, the coefficients on Opposition 
Opposite Party are negative and significant at the 5 percent level in both
models. Judges tend to avoid citing judges of the opposite party, par-
ticularly when faced with an opposing opinion of a judge from the
opposite party. Political affiliation matters more when the issues are
in contention (which is proxied for by the presence of an opposing opin-
ion by a judge of the opposite party). The coefficients on the interaction
terms Top Salient # Opposition_Same Party and Top Salient #
Opposition_Opposite Party are not significantly different from zero. The
tendency of judges to avoid citing opposite-party judges when faced with
an opposing opinion authored by an opposite-party judge is not more
pronounced for high-stakes subject matter categories.18
Judges may act differently when writing for the majority (when they
have the support of another judge) compared to when they act alone in
18. For robustness, we reestimated models 1 and 2, omitting Top Salient and the
interaction terms with Top Salient and adding the 18 indicator variables for the subject
matter categories (using “other” as the base category). We obtained similar qualitative
results with respect to Opposition_Same Party and Opposition_Opposite Party.
Opposition_Opposite Party was negative and significant at the 5 percent level in both
reestimated models (data not shown).
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Table 10. Opposing Opinions by Party and Type of Opinion
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Majority_v_Dissent_Same Party .022 (.680) .020 (.610)
Majority_v_Dissent_Opposite Party .058* (2.410) .051* (2.080)
Dissent_v_Majority_Same Party .017 (.380) .014 (.320)
Dissent_v_Majority_Opposite Party .034 (.990) .034 (.990)
Top Salient .032* (2.160) .031* (2.120)
GHP .022 (.590)
Top Salient # GHP .017 (.440)
Constant .072 (1.540) .446**(44.400)
Judge controls Yes No
Circuit fixed effects Yes No
Judge fixed effects No Yes
Note. The dependent variable is Opposite_Party. Both models contain year fixed effects
and have 3,072 observations. Judge controls include Opposite_Pool, Ln(Year_Exp), Chief
Judge, and Independence and are not reported. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are cal-
culated using Huber-White robust standard errors. The adjusted R2-value for both models
was .313.
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level.
** Coefficient significant at the 1% level.
writing an opposing opinion. In the case of a majority opinion, a judge
with the support of another judge may become emboldened to take a
more partisan stance. We predict that judges writing majority opinions
for which dissents exist will display greater bias in their citation patterns.
Majority_v_Dissent is defined as an opposition situation in which the
judge in question authors a majority opinion and another judge authors
a dissent. Dissent_v_Majority is defined as an opposition situation in
which the judge in question authors a dissenting opinion and another
judge authors the majority opinion. Using these definitions, we replace
Opposition in models 1 and 2 of Table 8 with Majority_v_Dissent_Same
Party, Majority_v_Dissent_Opposite Party, Dissent_v_Majority_Same
Party, and Dissent_v_Majority_Opposite Party.19 Table 10 reports our
results.20
Note that the coefficient is negative and significant (at the 5 percent
19. Note that Opposition p Majority_v_Dissent_Same Party  Majority_v_Dissent
_Opposite Party  Dissent_v_Majority_Same Party Dissent_v_Majority_Opposite Party.
20. For robustness, we reestimated model 1, omitting Top Salient and the interaction
terms with Top Salient and adding the 18 indicator variables for the subject matter cate-
gories (using “other” as the base category). We obtained similar qualitative results with
respect to Majority_v_Dissent_Same Party, Majority_v_Dissent_Opposite Party,
Dissent_v_Majority_Same Party, and Dissent_v_Majority_Opposite Party. Majority_v_
Dissent_Opposite Party was negative and significant at the 5 percent level (data not shown).
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level) for only the Majority_v_Dissent_Opposite Party interaction term
in both model 1 (which includes circuit fixed effects) and model 2 (which
includes judge fixed effects). The opposing-opinion bias effect exists pri-
marily when a judge writes a majority opinion in the presence of a
dissenting opinion by an opposite-party judge. This finding is consistent
with the view that judges, joined with other judges in a majority opinion,
are more likely to act in a biased manner when faced with a dissenting
opinion from an opposite-party judge. A next research step would be
to collect data on panel compositions and determine whether the effect
is exacerbated when the second judge in the majority is of the same
party as the writing judge.
4.4. Citation Club Hypothesis
To examine the citation club hypothesis, we make a summary statistic
comparison of the tendency of our sample judges to cite those who cite
them. We start by identifying for each judge in our sample the top five
outside-circuit judges (among other sample judges) who cited the par-
ticular judge the most (termed the “top five judges”). For example, con-
sider Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit. Outside of the Seventh
Circuit, Judges Selya, King, Boggs, Boudin, and Lynch cited Easterbrook
the greatest number of times in opinions authored in our sample period
from 1998 to 1999. For each opinion, we count the number of times
each judge cites the top five judges as a fraction of the total outside-
circuit citations to the sample judges. We call this fraction the
Top5_Cites.
As a comparison baseline, we calculate the total number of opinions
written by a top-five judge as a fraction of the total number of opinions
written by outside-circuit judges prior to 1998 (denoted as Top5_Pool).21
A t-test comparison of the means for Top5_Cites and Top5_Pool showed
that the mean for Top5_Cites (.186) is greater than the mean for
Top5_Pool (.140) (difference significant at the 1 percent level). Judges
are more likely to cite judges who cite them frequently, and this finding
is consistent with the citation club hypothesis.
We hypothesize that at least three different factors may affect a
judge’s propensity to cite judges who cite them. First, judges may cite
judges of a similar political persuasion. Second, judges with stronger
21. In several instances, ties occurred among judges, which led to more than five judges
who would qualify for the top-five category. In these situations, we adjusted the variable
Top5_Pool by including all tied judges to establish a comparison baseline.
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relationship ties with their specific top five outside-circuit judges may
cite them more frequently. Third, judges with particularly high reputa-
tions may cite their top five judges differently.
We estimate a multivariate model with Top5_Cites as the dependent
variable as follows, and the unit of analysis in our model is an individual
judicial opinion authored by a judge in our sample:
Top5_Cites p a bTest_Variables  b Control i ji ji ki ki
Year EffectsCircuit Effects  .i
We utilize a number of test variables in the model (denoted collec-
tively as Test_Variablesji). First, to test the importance of politics, we
include Top5_Same_Party, defined as the total number of opinions by
top-five judges before 1998 who are of the same party as the judge in
question divided by the total number of opinions by top-five judges
before 1998. A judge may be more likely to cite a top-five judge if the
top five judges are of the same political party. We also include Indepen-
dence, our measure of how independent a particular judge is from party
ideology (Choi and Gulati 2004). More independent judges may not
respond as much to ideology or citation club incentives and cite their
top five judges less frequently than less independent judges do.
Second, to assess the importance of relationship ties, we include
whether the judge graduated from a law school other than Harvard or
Yale, the two elite schools with a traditional dominance in the top po-
sitions in the federal judiciary and the greatest number of graduates
among our sample of judges (denoted Less Well Represented School).
Judges from less elite schools with lower representation among active
judges may feel a greater need to foster relationships with other judges
through citation practices. Alternatively, such judges may feel stronger
ties with the relatively small number of judges who did go to the same
less well represented school. To assess this latter possibility, we determine
the fraction of the top five judges who graduated from the same law
school as each particular judge (denoted Same School Fraction) and
include the variable in the model. We also include the log of the number
of years of experience for each judge in our sample (expressed as
ln(Year_Exp)). Judges with more experience will have had a longer time
to develop stronger ties with other judges.
Third, we examine the importance of two types of elite judges. We
include an indicator variable for whether the authoring judge is one of
the highest ranked judges based on the number of invocations by name
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each judge received in the opinions of outside-circuit judges in our sam-
ple (we denote the first five judges ranked on the basis of invocations
Influential Judge).22 Invocations indicate a special sign of respect (Choi
and Gulati 2004). We also include an indicator variable for whether the
authoring judge was the chief judge of her circuit at the time of the
opinion (denoted Chief Judge). Influential or chief judges, because of
their positions, may not need to cite their top five judges to improve
their reputation and may wish instead to foster a reputation of neutrality.
However, influential or chief judges may, because of their typically longer
tenure on the bench and higher reputation, develop stronger relationship
ties with outside-circuit judges, leading to greater citation club practices.
We include Top5_Pool to control for the pool of pre-1998 opinions
authored by the top five judges. Whenever the top five judges wrote
more opinions relative to all other judges, we expect a greater fraction
of citations to these judges because of their large pool of past opinions.
We also include Opposition as a control, to distinguish situations in
which the opinion is in opposition to another judge’s opinion on the
same case. We include Top Salient to control for the effect of an opinion’s
public salience on citation club practices. Finally, the model includes
year fixed effects and circuit fixed effects to control for differences related
to the specific year of the opinion and the circuit court of the judge in
question.
Table 11 reports our results. First, observe that the coefficient on
Top5_Same_Party is not significantly different from zero. We find no
evidence that judges are more likely to cite the top five judges when a
greater fraction of the top five judges are of the same political party. In
contrast, the coefficient on Independence is negative and significant at
the 10 percent level in model 1. A more negative Independence coefficient
indicates a greater tendency to side with one’s own party. Weak evidence
exists, therefore, that judges who tend to side with their own party are
also are more likely to cite those who cite them.
Second, our results indicate that more elite judges do not tend to cite
the same set of familiar judges citing them. The coefficients on Influential
Judge and Chief Judge are not significantly different from zero in model 1.
Third, note that the coefficient on Less Well Represented School is
positive and significant at the 1 percent level in model 1. The positive
coefficient indicates that graduates of schools other than Harvard and
Yale are more likely to engage in citation club practices. In model 1 the
22. These were Judges Posner, Easterbrook, Calabresi, Wilkinson, and Boudin.
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Table 11. Citation Clubs
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Top5_Same_Party .010 (.570) .021 (1.130)
Independence .061 (1.750) .063 (1.790)
Influential Judge .030 (1.250) .025 (1.030)
Chief Judge .038 (1.640) .038 (1.680)
Less Well Represented School .057** (2.720) .061** (2.840)
Same School Fraction .125 (1.650) .127 (1.680)
Ln(Year_Exp) .016 (1.400) .019 (1.630)
Year_Exp_Differential .003 (1.210)
Top5_Pool .988** (7.250) 1.018** (7.310)
Opposition .010 (.640) .010 (.670)
Top Salient .001 (.060) .001 (.040)
Constant .014 (.410) .008 (.210)
Note. The dependent variable is Top5_Cites. Both models contain year fixed effects and
circuit effects and have 3,054 observations. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated
using Huber-White robust standard errors. The P-value is for a t-test of the difference in
means between Top5_Cites and Top5_Pool. The adjusted R2-value for both models was
.035.
Coefficient significant at the 10% level.
** Coefficient significant at the 1% level.
coefficient on Same School Fraction is positive and significant at the 10
percent level. This finding is consistent with the view that, at least for
some judges, law school alumni network effects are driving the citation
club results.23
Judges may cite other judges with whom they have developed a long-
term familiarity. The log of the number of years of experience in the
circuit court is not significant, however. As a further test for this pos-
sibility, we add Year_Exp_Differential to model 2, defined as the absolute
value of the difference between a judge’s years of experience on the
federal circuit court and the mean years of federal circuit court expe-
rience for the top five judges. A judge in roughly the same experience
cohort as the top five judges who cites a top-five judge will have a low
value for Year_Exp_Differential. As is shown in Table 11, with this
experience cohort variable in model 2, we obtain the same qualitative
results as in model 1 (with the coefficient on Chief Judge still positive
23. We also added the interaction term Less Well Represented School # Same School
Fraction to model 1. The interaction term was not significantly different from zero (data
not shown). We therefore do not find evidence that the importance of attending the same
law school as the top five judges is any greater for judges that attended a less well rep-
resented law school.
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but now significant at the 10 percent level). The coefficient on
Year_Exp_Differential in model 2 is not significantly different from zero,
which is consistent with the view that experience cohort network effects
are not driving the tendency toward the citation club effect we observe.
Other types of bonds are possible among judges. The smaller the
community to which judges belong, the more likely it is that these com-
munal bonds will affect those judges’ decision making. Judges who
clerked for the same judge may enjoy enduring relationships with one
another. Similarly, judges who worked together at the Office of Legal
Counsel or the solicitor general’s office may view one another as close
colleagues. We leave to future research the question of whether more
tightly knit bonds between judges may affect citation practices.
4.5. Other Biases
Our analysis examines only how political ideology bias may affect ju-
dicial citation practices. Biases involving race, gender, and other factors
are also possible. We test the importance of one of these other possible
biases: gender.24 We divide our count of outside-circuit citations into
those to male and those to female judges. As a point of comparison, we
look at the pool of outside-circuit opinions authored prior to 1998 for
male and female judges in our sample of 98 judges. We then compare
the fraction of outside-circuit citations to male judges against the pool
of outside-circuit opinions authored by male judges for opinions writ-
ten by (a) the group of all judges in our sample, (b) male judges, and
(c) female judges.25 Table 12 reports our results.
Note from Table 12 that for all three categories of judges (all, male
only, and female only), the difference between the actual fraction of
outside-circuit citations to male judges and the pool of available male-
authored opinions is not significantly different from zero. Unlike for
political ideology, we are unable to find evidence that judges take into
account gender in their citation practices.
5. CONCLUSION
Studies of judicial voting patterns have cast doubt on the view of judges
as independent decision makers. Using data on citation practices, we
24. Of our 98 sample judges, only 12 were racial minorities. We leave to future research
the examination of the relationship between race and citation bias.
25. The fraction of citations to female judges is equal to one minus the fraction of
citations to male judges. Thus, we do not perform a similar analysis for citations to female
judges.
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Table 12. Fraction of Outside-Circuit Citations to Judges Segmented by Gender
N
Citations to
Male Judge
Pre-1998 Opinions
Authored by
Male Judge P
All opinions 3,072 .812 .819 .241
Male authored 2,370 .814 .817 .618
Female authored 702 .805 .824 .127
Note. The P-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between the fraction of citations
to a male judge and the fraction of the pool of pre-1998 opinions authored by a male
judge.
hope to have shed light not only on the processes by which judges reach
biased outcomes but also on how bias may play into the creation of
precedent. Judges tend to cite judges of the opposite political party sig-
nificantly less often than would be expected from the fraction of the
total pool of opinions attributable to judges of the opposite political
party. The presence of biases in citations also suggests that we should
view with suspicion attempts at ranking judges in terms of citation
counts.
Our study helps distinguish those factors that lead to citation bias.
If, for example, the bulk of biased citations were a product of simple
partisanship (that is, Democrat judges simply prefer citing other Dem-
ocrat judges), this bias should show up across the subject matter spec-
trum. In contrast, our study reports that judges are more likely to avoid
citing judges of the opposite political party in opinions dealing with
high-stakes subject matter (including our categories for campaign fi-
nance, rights, government actions, and capital punishment). These results
support the view that bias is likely the product of the specific ideologies
of the authoring judges. Future research should examine whether, con-
sistent with the findings of Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman (2004), there
exist panel effects—that is, whether the composition of the panels
(whether a panel is composed of all Democrats or of two Republicans
and a Democrat) affects citation behavior and whether those patterns
are also a function of subject area effects.
While judges seem prone to bias in high-stakes areas such as those
in our rights category, we also found citation bias in our areas of federal
business law and government actions that showed up at the bottom of
our political salience measures. Our federal business law category, for
example, includes securities regulation, an area in which judges are
thought to find most issues mundane and are thought to be primarily
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concerned with docket control (Grundfest and Pritchard 2002; Bain-
bridge and Gulati 2002; Sullivan and Thompson 2004). Further inquiry
into this result might shed light on what drives bias in citations in rel-
atively noncontroversial areas.
We also find that citation biases are more pronounced in cases in
which there is a dissent, particularly a dissent from a judge of the op-
posite party. The presence of conflict seems to alter the reasoning be-
havior of judges: they reason in a more ideologically polarized fashion.
Along the lines of Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006), it would
shed additional light on judicial behavior to examine whether these dif-
ferentials in citation patterns also show up in other areas of conflict,
such as when the appellate court is reversing a decision by a district
court, and particularly when that reversal is of a decision by an ideo-
logically different judge. One could also examine whether the patterns
of citations in en banc cases, cases in areas of first impression, and cases
with a circuit split are different from those in the more routine cases.
Judges tend to cite disproportionately those judges who cite them the
most. We report evidence that this tendency to engage in citation club
practices is greater for judges who graduated from less well represented
and less traditionally elite law schools among our sample of judges.
Moreover, weak evidence exists that the tendency to cite other judges
is greater if the other judges graduated from the same law school. How-
ever, we report weak evidence that judges who are more independent
from ideology are less likely to cite judges who cite them.
The bias we find is not all determinative. Judges often do cite judges
of the opposite party, which indicates that constraints against a purely
attitudinal approach to citations are binding on judges. Whether because
of a concern about reversal or their reputation, judges cite judges of the
opposite party frequently even in the subject matter areas we identify
with the largest amount of citation bias (such as rights).
Our study expands on judicial voting studies in at least two ways.
First, it provides a complement to these voting studies, demonstrating
a bias in citation patterns within opinion reasoning. Bias extends not
only to the outcome of a particular case but also to the rationale of the
case. To the extent the impact of a case on future cases depends on not
only the narrow outcome of a particular case but also the rationale
behind this outcome, our study demonstrates that bias has an important
effect on the substantive law.
Second, our study suggests that we can learn more about exactly how
ideological biases affect judges through examination of citation practices
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in ways unavailable through solely studying voting practices. Further
examination of citation practices could provide scholars with a new
method of measuring and understanding judicial biases, especially if the
results from citation studies are juxtaposed with those from voting stud-
ies. Maybe judges who display biases in citation practices also display
biases in voting, which would suggest that judges need to engage in
biased reasoning so as to reach or support biased outcomes. Alterna-
tively, maybe judges who engage in biased voting patterns are the least
likely to engage in biased citation patterns, which might suggest that
judges who are biased in voting also seek to cover their biases by dis-
proportionately citing the opinions of judges from the opposite party as
authority.
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Table A3. High Salience Ranking of Subject Matter Categories
Category Mentions
Mentions/
Opinions
Church and state 25 1.39
Campaign finance 27 1.17
Federalism 15 .94
First Amendment 47 .62
Rights 194 .43
Government actions 14 .35
Capital punishment 21 .28
Administrative law 26 .26
Takings and property 4 .19
Tax 12 .18
Federal business law 28 .13
Environment 5 .10
Intellectual property 5 .10
Torts 9 .09
Immigration 2 .04
Criminal 35 .03
Labor 10 .03
Private law 0 .00
Other 13 .12
Note. The total number of mentions is defined as the number of New York
Times front-page articles that mention both the U.S. Supreme Court and
the specific subject matter area between January 1, 1993, and December 31,
1997.
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